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viding sound, healthy citizens for the commonwealth. The present inter-
pretation of the pure food act by the Ohio courts adequately deals with
the situation.
The doctrine of warranty should be extended to cover members of
the family and guests. This concept has been incorporated into the Uni-
form Commercial Code.59 It has been propounded that the warranty of the
seller extends to any natural person who is in the family or household of
the buyer or who is a guest in his home if it -is -reasonable to expect that
such person may use, consume, or be affected by the goods and who is
thereby injured.
Viewing the many exceptions to the requriement of privity which are
manufactured by the courts leads one to an inevitable conclusion. At
least in situations -involving the sale of foods, the courts are unhappy with
the general privity requirement. This situation should be faced and
boldly determined by -less timorous courts.
If the courts insist on "privity of contract," then under the circum-
stances of modern merchandising, privity should be found to exist "full
blown" in the minds of the parties. In the event -that a more traditional
rationalization is demanded by the courts, it would seem proper to main-
tain that the warranty runs with the food, from the -time it is purchased
until it is finally consumed.
THomAs J. McGum
Cause of Action and the Statutes of
Limitation-The Chains That Bind"
"It is one of the maxims of the civil law that definitions are haz-
ardous."1 In 1853, the Ohio General Assembly affirmed legislative rec-
ognition of this rubric when they replaced the mystical and inflexible
writ system with a simplified code of civil procedure.2 For, in drawing
the code, the legislature left untouched the body of rules limiting the
right to bring suit. The assembly commanded that the statutes of limita-
tion run from the accrual of the cause of action but failed to define cause
of action. As the ancient metaphysicians vainly sought the definition of
beauty, the energy of countless jurisprudents has since been fruitlessly ex-
hausted in an attempt to define this illusive concept. In their zeal to es-
tablish one form of action, the legislators wholly neglected a revision of
the statutes of limitation. These chronological periods still differed from
one substantive cause to another. The attempt of the judiciary to recon-
'UNIFORM COMM [ERCIAL CODE, § 2-318 (1952).
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cile the new factual pleadings with the old statutes of limitation anoma-
lously preserved the old forms of action.
Under the old writ system, the judge knew by a glance at the formal-
ized declaration exactly which statute of limitations applied. After the
code revision, the petitions stated facts which might embody more than
one theory of recovery. The choice of a proper theory became a matter
to be proven at the trial stage. The choice of the proper period of limi-
tation, still dependent on the nature of the cause of action, also became
a problem to be resolved at the trial, after the theory of recovery had been
chosen. But due more to habit than to reason, the courts continued to
label the facts as one certain cause of action so as to select the statute of
limitation at the pleading stage of the trial
The interrelated problems arising from the failure to define cause of
action and from the preservation of the antithetical and misplaced statutes
of limitation will be considered in this note. An examination of the
meaning of cause of action, the Ohio case law determining its accrual, and
the use and rationale of the Ohio statutes of limitation may reveal the na-
ture of the remedies needed to end this confusion.
CAUSE OF ACTION- STORicAL DEVELOPMENT
In an age of organization and definition the cause of action concept
has grown more obscure. An examination of the meaning of cause of
action, before and after the revision of civil procedure might explain this
paradox.
Historically the common law writ was a statement of a substantive
action recognized by the King's courts and invoking their jurisdiction.a
When oral pleadings were replaced by written declarations,4 lawyers drew
their petitions in the form of these writs so as to assure the plaintiff that
the court would entertain the claim. Cause of action was at this time the
statement of the substantive elements of an accepted wrong merely
clothed in facts. Each cause was distinct, and was easily identifiable by
the uniqueness of the elements and the phraseology of the declaration. 5
This was the era of rigidity and certainty.
The age of flexibility and uncertainty of the cause of action dawned
with the enactment of the Ohio Code of Civil Procedure in 1853.6 The
'Samuel Johnson.
2 51 Omo LAws 57.
8KIEGWIN, CAsES IN COMMON LAW PLEADING §§ 5, 10 (2d ed. 1934).
lId. § 11.
rKIEGWIN, CASES IN COMMON LAW PLEADING §S 16, 17 (2d ed. 1934).
51 OMO LAws 57.
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goal of this revision was the development of a truly 'flexible system (for
the) prompt dispatch of litigated business... limited only by the con-
venience of the trial. ' '7 (emphasis added) To accomplish this goal, the
old forms of action were abolished.8 Substantive elements now called
conclusions of law were excluded from the pleadings.9 The more flexible
petition now by nature factual rather than substantive brought uncer-
tainty. The judge was compelled to infer a right to bring suit from a
statement of the facts. Many times the facts reflected an amalgam of
several old substantive actions. Yet the courts had new and more diffi-
cult questions to answer. Did a cause of action inhere in the facts? If
one existed, which theory of recovery did it reflect? Did the facts state
more than one cause? If so, were the causes properly joined? Deter-
mined to resolve these questions at the pleading stage of the trial, the
courts sought tests for determining cause of action which might reinstate
the certainty of the old writ system. When applied to the facts of a
given transaction, however, these tests were shown to be indefinite and
subjective. Consideration of two such tests, Pomeroy's -gist" theory and
Clark's "transaction" theory demonstrates their obscurity.
Pomeroy, "father of the thoughts of a majority of the courts and
writers"'0 defined the cause of action as "the primary right and duty and
the delict or wrong."" Though Pomeroy regarded this definition as an
"unerring test' 2 its use has resulted in a misleading search of the plead-
ing for the gist or nature of the cause. When a single transaction pre-
sents a plurality of rights and duties, the courts, following this singular
definition, seize on one right which they term the gist, excluding all
others. A court might regard a transaction involving fraud on a contract
as a suit on the warranty and excluding the elements of fraud, bar the
suit by applying a short statute limiting the right to bring contract ac-
tions.13 With equal veracity the court might exclude the contract ele-
ments and permit the suit by applying the longer period of limitations
restricting claims arising out of fraud.' 4 When applied to a given trans-
action, Pomeroy's certainty becomes vagueness.
Other theories like that of Pomeroy reduce the cause of action to a
"Sherlock v. Manwaren, 208 App. Div. 538, 540, 203 N.Y. Supp. 709, 711 (4th
Dep't. 1924).
#51 Oio LAws 57.
'Millville Gas Light Co. v. Sweeten, 74 N. J. L. 24, 64 Ad. 959 (Sup. Ct. 1906).
'
0 Bilikan v. Columbus Ry. & Light Co., 10 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 561, 564 (1910).
u PoMmROY, CODE REMEDIES 5 347 (5th ed. 1929).
12 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 137 (2d ed. 1947).
1 Quintard v. Newton, 5 Robt. 72 (1867).
"Moore v. Noble, 53 Barb. 425 (1867).
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NOTES
bare formula emphasizing as controlling either the "right,' 15 the "duty,"
the "wrong,"'1 or the "remedy." All of the theories look good on paper.
None stands the test of workabliity. The failure of similar all-solving
formulae must have led Shakespeare to comment, "there was never yet a
philosopher that could endure the toothache patiently."
Viewing the cause of action as a lay witness might view it, devoid of
classifying legal rules, is Clark's realistic approach.'T The cause of action
stated as a chronological and continual fact transaction seems closest to
the intent of the code commissioners. This view however, offers the
judge no answers to questions such as which statutory period of limita-
tions governs, and at what point the cause of action accrues.
For procedural purposes, the cause of action is no more than the
allegation of all the "operative facts"' 8 which give rise to the right to
bring suit. If a right to sue whether on one or many substantive theories
is present in plaintiff's final petition, the suit should be commenced. The
proof of these rights and duties, the accrual of the cause, the selection of
the proper statute of limitations must be left to the trial. When asked
the meaning of "cause of action" under the code the safest answer is that
of Lewis Carroll's Humpty Dumpty, "just what I choose it to mean -
neither more nor less."
THE STATuTEs OF LIMITATION
No segment of our law is more automatically used with less thought
than the statutes of limitation. The Ohio periods of limitation have not
been substantially modified since 1804.j9 As mentioned, the drafters of
the code revisions perpetuated the old forms of action when they left
these limitations almost untouched. Speculation over their function and
rationale might show us not what they are, but what they should be.
The limitations have two justifications. Perhaps the historical ra-
tionale is based on the suafficiency of evidewce needed to prove a claim.20
As time passes witnesses to an event become unavailable and memories
fade. For practical reasons a court does not consider a case after a cer-
a McCaskin, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 YA.E L J. 614, 638 (1925).
" BLiss, CODE PLEADING §§ 113, 114 (2d ed. 1887).
17CLARK, CODE PLEADING 128 (2d ed. 1947).
w Ibid.
"2 OMO LAws 60. While the labels on the actions have been changed and new
categories added from time to time the chronological periods are substantially the
same.
"The original limitation on a "writ of right" was the time of memory. The time
of memory was later defined as the reign of Richard I. It was subsequently reduced
to 50 years and has since diminished to its present 20 or 21 years. HALE, HISTORY
op THE COMMON LAW (1779).
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tain time, since it is thought to be incapable of proof. On this reasoning,
those causes dependent upon oral testimony such as trespass, were barred
sooner than a cause founded upon some writing, such as contract. The
second basis for the limitations grew out of the equity notion that the in-
activity of the plaintiff constituted acqaiescence to the defendant's breach
of duty.2 1 Logically, the mere running of time was not acquiescence. If
the plaintiff was under some disability so that he could not bring suit,
the statute did not run against him.
22
AccRuAL OF CAUSE OF ACTION
The development of rules determining the point at which a cause of
action accrues is an illuminating study of the conflicting forces that mold
our judicial process. Analysis of this area reveals a duel between the
common law and legislation and a rivalry between precedent and policy.
The most interesting and most vexatious problems will be considered:
(1) those which by their nature, or the acts of the defendant are not
known to the plaintiff, and (2) those arising out of contractual obliga-
tions.
The history of the rules governing the unknown wrong is important
to an understanding of the modern rules. Prior to the code revision of
1853, law and equity were two distinct systems. The statutes of limita-
tions did not include the pure equity actions. In equity cases such as
fraud, mistake and breach of trust, the cause of action accrued on the dis-
covery of the cause by the plaintiff.23
The law courts following the letter of the statute of limitations, held
that the cause accrued from the commission of the wrong even though
by its nature or by the acts of the defendant the plaintiff had no knowl-
edge of it. In Kerns v. Schoonmaker24 the court held that the cause of
action does not run from discovery. In Fee v. Fee" the court found that
fraudulent concealment does not bar the running of the statute in suits at
law even though it does bar the running of time in equity.
In adopting the "Code of Civil Procedure," the Ohio legislature with
one penstroke abolished the procedural distinction between law and
'Woolsey v. Trimble, 18 F. 2d 908 (6th Cir. 1927) : dictum.
nOHIo REv. CODE §§ 2305.19, 2305.21.
'Longworth v. Hunt, 11 Ohio St. 194 (1860); and Williams v. Presbyterian
Church, 1 Ohio St. 478 (1853). Although written after the code revision both
cases illustrate the equity view. It was felt that the defendant ought not in con-
science avail himself of the running of time when the wrong was unknown to the
plaintiff.
24 Ohio 331 (1831).
Z 10 Ohio 469 (1841).
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equity, and the forms of all such actions and suits.26 Forewarned against
the strict construction given all statutes in derogation of the common law
the legislature commanded in the code that "its provisions and all pro-
ceedings under it shall be liberally construed with a view to promote its
object. 27 (emphasis added) In accordance with the termination of the
law-equity dichotomy, a statute was added to the existing limitations, re-
stricting the right to bring suit "on the ground of fraud." The equity
rule was adopted and the period ran from the "discovery" of the fraud.28
Contemporary annotators believed that this section abolished the rule of
the Fee case that fraudulent concealment ran from the act, not from dis-
covery.P9 However, in controversion to the code the Ohio Supreme Court
construed the statute strictly and continued the pre-code Fee rule. 0  On
two subsequent occasions the failure of the courts to apply the rule of
"discovery" to unknown wrongs led to speedy legislative amendment of
the statutes of limitation in dear derogation of both court deciiions.81
Construed liberally in the spirit of the code revisions, these two amend-
ments spell out a legislative intent to make those wrongs which are un-
known by their nature, or by the acts of the defendant, accrue at their
discovery.
Despite these amendments the courts still refused to apply the rule
of "discovery" to equity rights when, they arose in conjunction with a
legal right. When the trustee of an express trust misappropriated the
funds of the trust the cause was held to have accrued at the discovery of
the fraud.a2 But in those cases in which elements of law and equity are
mixed the courts consistently exclude the equity elements, hold that the
051 Omo LAws 57.
=Ibid.
'Id. at 59.
=2 SWAN & CRITCH., 949 n. 1.
$Lathrop v. Snellbaker, 6 Ohio St 276 (1856). Ohio's courts were joining the
great opposition to the reform by reducing it through strict construction to "the
empty change in a few words." POMEROY, CODE REmEDiES § 453 (5th ed. 1929).
8In Howk v. Minnick, 19 Ohio St. 462 (1869) the court ruled that the statute of
limitations governing fraud did not apply to the plaintiff's claim of fraudulent con-
cealment of a prior conversion of his personal property. The legislature amended
the statutes of limitation accruing actions "for the wrongful taking of personal
property... (from) the discovery of the wrongdoer." 64 OHIO LAws 145. In
Williams v. Pomeroy Coal Co., 37 Ohio St. 583 (1882) the Supreme Court, citing
the Howk case, held that lack of knowledge of a trespass to underground coal mines
did not bar the running of the statutory period thereby accruing the cause of action
from the wrongful act rather than from discovery. The legislature then added the
provision, "in an action for trespass underground or injury to mines, the action shall
not be deemed to have accrued until the wrongdoer is discovered." 81 OmHO LAWS
145.
' Schofield v. Cleveland Trust Co., 149 Ohio St. 133, 78 N.E.2d 167 (1948); OHIo
REv. CODE 5 2305.22.
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gist of the action is the legal right, and bar the suit. In a leading case
suit was brought against the trustees for loss sustained due to their bad
faith and negligence in the purchase of stock. The court ruled that the
gist of the action was not fraud and that therefore the statute could not
run from discovery. Reluctant to hold that a cause founded on breach
of trust ran from the wrongful act, the court compromised and held that
the cause accrued at the termination of the trust relationship.38
Even when breach of trust has been coupled with fraudulent conceal-
ment, the courts have held that fraud is not the gist of the action and
that the cause accrues at the time of the act rather than at discovery 34 In
Minster Loan & Savings v. Laufersweiler35 the court said that the "ap-
plicable statute is to be determined from the nature of the action."'3 6 The
court ignored its own rule, and determining the cause solely on the na-
ture of the relief sought, barred the suit.
The restriction of the equity notion of "discovery" seems to be due
to three factors: (1) the strict construction of the statute of limitation
governing fraud given by the early decisions; (2) the continuation of the
Fee and Kerns rules; and (3) the attempt to glean the single nature of
cause out of a transaction thereby excluding the other rights involved
in it.
Malpractice
The malpractice suit best illustrates the accrual of tort actions when
the wrong is undiscovered. The attempt to avoid the harsh results of a
short one year period37 can be seen to conflict with the well settled Kerns
rule that the cause accrues at the breach of duty rather than at dis-
covery. In malpractice suits brought against physicians the usual serious
nature of the plaintiff's injury has given rise to a judicial policy favoring
the preservation of plaintiff's right to sue. In the earliest Ohio suit of
this type the court upheld the plaintiff's right to bring suit by asserting
that the foundation of a malpractice suit was not the contractual relation
but was rather the doctor's negligence.3 8  In Fronce v. Nicholls39 the
' State ex rel Lien v. House, 144 Ohio St. 238, 58 N.E.2d 675 (1944); OHIo REV.
CODE § 2305.22.
"'Minster Loan & Savings Co. v. Laufersweiler, 67 Ohio App. 375, 36 N.E.2d 895
(1940).
z5 Ibid.
'Id. at 378, 36 N.E. 2d at 897.
"OHIo REv. CODE § 2305.11.
Shuman v. Drayton, 14 Ohio C.C.R. 328 (1897); This suit was brought one day
before the residual four year period of limitation had terminated. After the cause
of action arose but before the instigation of the suit the legislature had expressly
included malpractice in the one year period along with libel, slander, etc. Since the
statute was not retroactive it did not apply.
"22 Ohio C.C.R. 539 (Ct. App. 1901).
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court followed the Kerns rule and held that the statute ran from the act.
While barring the suit the court suggested that the statute "be amended
... in order that knowledge of the resulting injury ... would cause the
action to accrue."40  In 1902 the supreme court in Gillette v. Tucker41
attempted to avoid the oppressive result of the entrenched Kerns rule.
A sponge was left in the abdominal cavity during an operation. The
court held that the injury was not negligently leaving the sponge but con-
tinuing to leave it. Ruling that the period ran from the undefined "con-
sequential injury"42 the majority found that the suit was not yet barred.
Three judges dissented invoking the Kerns rule. Just three years later
the supreme court overruled the Gillette majority and decided McArthur
v. Bowers43 on the reasoning of the dissenting opinion of the Gillette
case. The problem lay dormant until 1918 when the inflexibility of the
Kerns rule was again demonstrated. Suit was brought just five days
after the statutory period had elapsed - if computed from the original
negligent act. To preserve the suit, the court held that the cause of action
accrued two weeks after the operation when the physician failed to re-
move the sponge upon removal of the stitches.44
The following year the supreme court overruled the McArthur deci-
sion. In Bowers v. Santee 5 the doctor had negligently set a broken leg
which he continued to treat for one year. Defendant's negligence was
dearly confined to his first careless act. The element present in the
Gillette case justifying continuing negligence - the constant irritation
of a foreign body - did not exist. The court saved the suit by holding
that the cause of action accrued at the termination of the contractual re-
lationship. The original Ohio holding that malpractice is not founded on
the contract was ignored or forgotten.46 Between 1920 and 1953 seven
cases were decided following the "contract" theory fabricated in the
Bowers case. In three of these, evidence was presented showing a con-
tinuing relation subsequent to the wrongful act bringing the suits within
the statutory period.47  Four suits concerning the special services of a
doctor during an operation were barred.48
"Id. at 542.
4167 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902). Avoiding any suspicion that the court was
casting doubt on the intrenched Kerns rule, the court asserted that plaintiffs lack of
knowledge of the injury was not considered in the decision.
'
2 Ibid. at p. 127, 65 N.E. at 870 (1902).
"72 Ohio St. 656, 76 N.E. 1128 (1905).
"Home v. Pawlicki, 14 Ohio App. 94 (1918).
"99 Ohio St. 361, 124 N.E. 238 (1910).
"Shuman v. Drayton, 14 Ohio C.C.R. 328 (1897).
'Amstutz v. King, 103 Ohio St. 674, 135 NE. 973 (1921); Meyers v. Clarkin, 33
Ohio App. 165, 168 N.E. 771 (1929); Netzel v. Todd, 24 Ohio App. 219 (1926).
"DeLong v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E. 2d 177 (1952); Swankowski v.
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Neither the "contract" theory nor the "continuing trespass" theory
was completely successful in saving malpractice suits from the short pe-
riod. Only one dissenter urged the abandonment of consistency and the
revival of the "continuing trespass" theory thereby saving a suit barred on
the "contract" rule.49 Most courts confined their dissatisfaction to a plea
for legislative change of the short malpractice limitation statute.50
The sympathy for the plaintiff underlying medical malpractice suits
does not seem to transfer to litigation involving the negligence of an at-
torney. In a 1923 case, the suit was barred even though the judge ac-
cepted the "contract" theory.5 ' In a later suit the "contract" theory would
have preserved the plaintiff's right to sue but the judge, distinguishing
the physician's services from that of the lawyer's, held the statute to have
run from the initial act of negligence, barring the suit.52
Thus the rule that the cause of action accrues upon discovery of the
injury was given a strict construction by courts seeking to minimize the
change in the common law. The succeeding generation of judges in-
herited the anti-legislation precedent of its forebearers. Faced with the
choice of breaking with precedent and giving the statutes a liberal con-
struction, or following precedent, the courts chose the latter. The severe
result of this choice frustrated both the unsuccessful litigant barred on a
procedural technicality and the judge. The useful rule of discovery lies
dormant, and the courts remain linked to harsh precedent by chains
forged by their predecessors.
Contractual Duties
The accrual of a cause of action arising out of the breach of con-
tractual duties again illustrates the confusion growing out of the at-
tempted solution of factual and substantive problems at the pleading level
Diethelm, 98 Ohio App. 271, 129 N.E.2d 182 (1953); Truxel v. Goodman, 38
Ohio L. Abs. 113, 49 N.E. 2d 569 (Ct. App. 1942); Seater v. Lower, 25 Ohio App.
328 (1927).
"'De Long v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 31, 104 N.E.2d 171, 181, (1952); "The
continuing effects (of the) tortious conduct" extended beyond the period of con-
tractual relationship postponing the running of the statute "until it is reasonably
possible for -the victim... to discover the wrong."
' De Long v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 27, 104 N.E. 2d 177, 179 (1952): "The
legislative branch ... (has) fixed the time when the statute (shall run) ... It is
not our function ...to disregard, by legislating, a legislative enactment." The
court then suggested that the legislature change the statute as it had after the Wil-
liams case, 37 Ohio St. 583 (1882), supra n. 43, when it made the applicable stat-
ute run from discovery negating the court's decision, 81 OHIo LAws 145; and
Truxel v. Goodman, 38 Ohio L. Abs. 113, 117, 49 N.E. 2d 569 (Ct. App. 1942):
"We think some change in the limitation statute could very properly be made."
'
t McWilliams v. Hackett, 19 Ohio App. 416 (1923).
' Galloway v. Hood, 69 Ohio App. 278, 43 N.E.2d 631 (1941).
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of the suit. The first of such problems involves the question: Does the
petition state one complete transaction, or many separate transactions?
This issue arose in an action brought by a physician to recover for services
rendered during 31 housecalls made while the patient suffered from
pneumonia. If considered as separate transactions each commencing the
running of the statute, many of the claims would have been barred. If
considered as one transaction, the statute would have run from his final
call and the entire claim would have been within the period. The court
reasoned that had the claim been for services rendered during a case of
pneumonia it would have constituted one transaction. However, since the
petition related separate house calls, the court held that the "right of ac-
tion accrues on each item at date.. 53  The nature of the services deter-
mining the computation of the period of limitation was a factual prob-
lem to be proven in the suit not dismissed in the pleadings.
A final problem exists when the transaction affords both a right in
tort, and one arising out of implied contract. Since the latter has a
longer period of limitations, claims barred under the tort element might
be brought successfully under the contract right. Again the courts show
a tendency to pinpoint the "gist" of the action at the pleading stage. Ohio
courts have held that the "gist" of the action was tort, and barred the
suit,5 4 and that the "gist" was implied contract and admitted it.55
CONCLUSION
The analysis of the case law governing the accrual of cause of
action and the selection of the statute of limitations discloses two con-
sistent abuses of procedure resulting in the exclusion of valid claims;
(1) to determine which statute of limitation applies the courts attempt
to fit a complex transaction involving more than one theory of recovery
into a single pigeon-hole classification excluding the other theory;
(2) the courts hold that a cause of action in which the injury is by its
nature unknown to the plaintiff accrues at the time of the wrongful act
rather than at the discovery of the injury. Fundamental to the elimina-
tion of these ills is the recognition of the nature of cause of action and
the rationale of the statutes of limitation, under the rules of code pleading.
The certainty of cause of action disappeared with the abolition of
the writ system. Today's petition is no longer a statement of substantive
elements but is rather a statement of facts. For procedural purposes the
'Munro v. Jakovseck, 26 Ohio L. Abs. 449 (Ct. App. 1937); see: Pelton v. Bemis,
44 Ohio St 51, 4 N.E. 714 (1886).
' Andrianos v. Community Traction Co., 155 Ohio St. 47, 97 N.E. 2d 549 (1951).
'Ohio Casualty las. Co. v. Capolino, 44 Ohio L. Abs. 564, 65 N.E. 2d 287 (Ct.
App. 1945).
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cause of action is no more than the transaction as a natural unit contain-
ing facts which justify a right to sue. To avoid burdensome procedural
technicality, prior to the trial the court should recognize that the facts
alleged state at least one right, a correlative duty and breach of duty
which if proven will give rise to a right to a remedy against the defend-
ant. While many matters of procedure must be resolved at the pleading
stage, the selection of the right on which the claim is based when more
than one is pleaded, should be left to the introduction of evidence and
proof during the trial."
The problem arising out of our 1804 model statutes of limitation can
be solved by drawing a new procedural statute of limitation which con-
forms both to the unitary form of code pleading avoiding all substantive
differences and the rationale behind the periods of limitation. The statute
must apply uniformly to all causes of action, scaled only to the sufficiency
of evidence supporting the suit. A future statute might have a shorter
period limiting claims supported solely by oral testimony, and a longer
period restricting those claims which are supported by both oral testi-
mony and any written proof that is acceptable under the rules of evi-
dence. The statute must also have saving clauses defining the circum-
stances which prevent the running of the statutory period when the plain-
tiff has not acquiesced. Those already existing saving clauses: minority, 7
insanity,5s imprisonment, 59 absence of the defendant from the jurisdic-
tion,6° and others,61 should be retained and clarified. The rule of dis-
covery should be restated so that wrongs which by their nature, or due
to the active concealment or misrepresentation of the defendant are un-
known, shall accrue at the discovery of the wrong or the time that it
should reasonably have been discovered.
The law is like an oyster. In the oyster, constant irritation of a for-
eign body results in the production of a pearl In the law, continual
maladjustment and irritation leads to the development of more workable
modes of resolving human conflict. The production of a legal "pearl"
'Masten v. Levy, 17 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 267, 270, 271, afd., 86 Ohio St. 363
(1912): "It is manifest that the intermingling of allegations . . .concerning the
same transactions does not necessarily commit the pleader to a single theory of his
right to recover. He may introduce evidence in support of both aspects of his
case, and recover in either or both, according to the proof...
"OHio Rnv. CODE § 2305.16.
'ibid.
'Ibid.
"OHio REv. CODE § 2305.15.
1 OHio REv. CODE § 2305.22: The statutes of limitation do not run in restriction
of a right to bring suit against a trust until the termination of the trust relationship.
Nor do they run against the right of a purchaser in possession of real property to
obtain a conveyance.
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took place in Ohio 104 years ago when the legislature adopted a simpli-
fied code of civil procedure. Such a major legislative reform, unlike the
,pearl, is not the end product but is rather the -beginning. Constant
reformation and supplementation in the spirit of the original reform is
necessary to meet unforeseen problems as they arise. As can be seen, the
"perpetual revision" is a task for both the legislature and the judiciary.
The legislature must continually seek greater clarity of intent.62 The
courts must frequently expound the statute as a principle of law applying
it by analogy to a new situation.63  When this change stops, the ills con-
tinue, and the machinery created by the original reform functions poorly.
This breakdown is well illustrated by the failure of the judiciary to realis-
tically integrate cause of action and the statutes of limitation into the
code. The enactment of new statutes of limitation which comport with
the code of civil procedure and the rationale of the periods of limitation;
and the recognition that cause of action is basically factual under the
code, will resume the reform and grease the machinery of code pleading.
New problems will arise. In meeting them, the lawmaker must realize
that while precedent and cumulative experience wards off capriciousness;
prompt and realistic adaptability to change preserves the laws utility to
the community.
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